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Abstract
We develop a number of variants of Lifschitz realizability for CZF
by building topological models internally in certain realizability models.
We use this to show some interesting metamathematical results about
constructive set theory with variants of LLPO including consistency with
unique Church’s thesis, consistency with some Brouwerian principles and
variants of the numerical existence property.
1 Introduction
In [22] and [23], Van Oosten shows how the Lifschitz realizability topos can
be viewed as a category of sheaves over a particular Lawvere-Tierney topology
constructed in the effective topos. Although a remarkable result, it has some
shortcomings:
1. The construction refers explicitly to computable functions and Lifschitz’s
encoding of finite sets. This makes it appear that the construction is
unique to the effective topos and cannot be carried out in other toposes.
2. The construction relies on many technical definitions and techniques from
topos theory.
3. The construction is not guaranteed to work predicatively.
In this paper we will give a new presentation of this result. Instead of topos
theory we work in the set theory CZF, which is regarded as a predicative theory
for mathematics. Instead of Lawvere-Tierney topologies, we will use formal
topologies and a predicative notion of topological model due to Gambino.
Aside from this difference in presentation, our results are more general than
Van Oosten’s in two ways (although the first of these does relate to some more
recent results by Lee and Van Oosten in [10]).
Firstly, instead of considering just one formal topology, we will consider an
infinite family of formal topologies Ln for each natural number n ≥ 2, with the
original Lifschitz realizability model just corresponding to the formal topology
L2. The topologies Ln correspond to certain variants of LLPO, which were
first studied by Richman in [19], and are denoted LLPOn. We will use these
models to give a new proof of a theorem due to Hendtlass and Lubarsky in [9]:
LLPOn+1 is strictly weaker than LLPOn. This answers positively a question
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raised by Hendtlass: is there a variant of Lifschitz realizability that separates
LLPOn from LLPOn+1?
Secondly, we identify axioms, IPFn,NN that hold in the McCarty realizability
model V (K1) that suffice to carry out internally the construction of the formal
topologies Ln we will use in the models. This can be done entirely in CZF +
MP + IPFn,NN , without any explicit reference to computable functions. This
enables us to easily generate variants of Lifschitz realizability by simply checking
that the same axioms IPFn,NN hold in other realizability models. By using
realizability with truth in this way we will show that the theories CZF+MP+
LLPOn have certain variants of the numerical existence property. By using
realizability over K2 in this way we will show that CZF+ LLPO is consistent
with certain (but not all) Brouwerian continuity principles.
A more traditional version of Lifschitz realizability for CZF+LLPO+CT!
similar to that in [5] can be recovered by a two step process of interpreting
the topological model V (L2) in the McCarty realizability model V (K1), itself
constructed in CZF+MP as illustrated below.
Theory CZF+MP CZF+MP CZF+MP
+LLPO+CT! +IPF2,NN +CT0
→֒ →֒
Model V (L2) V (K1) V
2 Constructive Set Theory
We will consider the intuitionistic set theories CZF and IZF, as described for
instance in [1] or [2].
We will use the following set theoretic formulations of Markov’s principle
and Church’s thesis.
Definition 2.1. Markov’s principle,MP, is the following axiom. Let α : N→ 2
be a function. Then,
¬¬ (∃n ∈ N)α(n) = 1 → (∃n ∈ N)α(n) = 1
Definition 2.2. Church’s thesis, CT0 is the following axiom. Let φ(x, y) be
any formula. Then, writing {e}(n) to mean the result of running the eth Turing
machine with input n,
(∀n ∈ N)(∃m ∈ N)φ(n,m) → (∃e ∈ N)(∀n ∈ N)φ(n, {e}(n))
Church’s thesis for functions, CT! is the axiom that every function from N
to N is computable.
We recall the following definitions and theorems on finite sets, as appear in
[2, Chapters 6 and 8]. The theorems will often be used implicitly while working
with finitely enumerable sets.
Definition 2.3. A set X is finite if for some n ∈ N there exists a bijection from
n to X .
A set X is finitely enumerable if for some n ∈ N there exists a surjection
from n to X .
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Theorem 2.4 (CZF). Suppose that φ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula of arithmetic,
where all quantifiers are bounded, and the only free variables are amongst x1, . . . , xn.
Then we can prove the following instance of excluded middle.
(∀x1, . . . , xn ∈ N) φ(x1, . . . , xn) ∨ ¬φ(x1, . . . , xn)
Proof. See [2, Theorem 6.6.2].
Theorem 2.5 (CZF). “The Pigeonhole Principle for Finitely Enumerable Sets.”
Let A be a finitely enumerable set. Every injective function f : A ֌ A is also
a surjection.
Proof. See [2, Theorem 8.2.10].
Theorem 2.6 (CZF). “The Finite Axiom of Choice.” Suppose A is a finite set,
B is any set, and R ⊆ A×B is a relation such that (∀a ∈ A)(∃b ∈ B) 〈a, b〉 ∈ R.
Then there is a function f : A→ B such that for all a ∈ A, 〈a, f(a)〉 ∈ R.
Proof. See [2, Theorem 8.2.8].
We can also prove a finite version of LPO:
Theorem 2.7 (CZF). For every finitely enumerable set X and every f : X →
2, either there exists some x ∈ X such that f(x) = 1 or for all x ∈ X, f(x) = 0.
Proof. Show by induction on n that if there is a surjection n ։ X then the
result holds for X .
3 Formal Topologies and Heyting Valued Mod-
els of CZF
3.1 Basic Definitions
We recall the basic definitions of formal topology and Gambino’s Heyting valued
interpretation of CZF. For details see [8]. The basic idea here is that to each
formula in set theory, we assign an open set, which we think of as the “truth
value” of the formula. We use Gambino’s presentation of topological models
since it can be formalised in, and provides models for CZF.
Definition 3.1. If 〈S,≤〉 is a poset, and p is a subset of S, we write p ↓ for the
downwards closure of p. That is,
p ↓ := {x ∈ S | (∃y ∈ p)x ≤ y}
Definition 3.2. A formal topology is 〈S,≤, ⊳〉 such that 〈S,≤〉 is a poset, and
⊳ is a (class) relation between elements and subsets of S, such that
1. if a ∈ p, then a ⊳ p
2. if a ≤ b and b ⊳ p, then a ⊳ p
3. if a ⊳ p and (∀x ∈ p)(x ⊳ q), then a ⊳ q
4. if a ⊳ p and a ⊳ q, then a⊳ ↓ p∩ ↓ q
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Definition 3.3. Let S := 〈S,≤, ⊳〉 be a formal topology. A set-presentation for
S is a (set) function R : S → P(PS) such that
a ⊳ p↔ (∃u ∈ R(a))u ⊆ p
If (S,≤, ⊳) has a set-presentation, we say it is set-presentable.
Definition 3.4. Let S := 〈S,≤, ⊳〉 be a set presentable formal topology. We
define the nucleus of S to be the following class function j : P(S)→ P(S). For
p ⊆ S,
j(p) := {a ∈ S | a ⊳ p}
We extend j to an operation, J , on subclasses of S by
J(P ) :=
⋃
{j(v) | v ⊆ P}
Definition 3.5. We say a formal topology 〈S,≤, ⊳〉 is proper if for all a ∈ S,
¬a ⊳ ∅. (Or equivalently if j(∅) = ∅.)
Definition 3.6. Let S = 〈S,≤, ⊳〉 be a set presentable formal topology. The
class V (S) is defined inductively as the smallest class such that f ∈ V (S) when-
ever f is a function with dom(f) ⊆ V (S) and for all x ∈ dom(f), f(x) is a
⊳-closed subset of S.
For each sentence φ in the language of set theory with parameters from V (S),
we assign a ⊳-closed class denoted JφK, which we define by induction on formulas
as follows. For bounded φ, JφK will be a set.
We first define a complete Heyting algebra structure on the class of ⊳-closed
classes as follows. For P and Q ⊳-closed classes,
⊤ := S
⊥ := J(∅)
P ∧Q := P ∩Q
P ∨Q := J(P ∪Q)
P → Q := {a ∈ S | a ∈ P → a ∈ Q}∨
x∈U
Px := J
(⋃
x∈U
Px
)
∧
x∈U
Px :=
⋂
x∈U
Px
We define the interpretation of atomic sentences a ∈ b and a = b by simul-
taneous induction on a and b:
a ∈ b :=
∨
c∈dom(b)
b(c) ∧ Ja = cK
a = b :=
∧
c∈dom(a)
a(c)→ Jc ∈ bK ∧
∧
c∈dom(b)
b(c)→ Jc ∈ bK
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We then extend this to all formulas as below.
J⊥K := ⊥
Jφ ∧ ψK := JφK ∧ JψK
Jφ ∨ ψK := JφK ∨ JψK
Jφ→ ψK := JφK → JψK
J(∃x ∈ a)φK :=
∨
x∈dom(a)
JφK
J(∀x ∈ a)φK :=
∧
x∈dom(a)
JφK
J(∃x)φK :=
∨
x∈V (S)
JφK
J(∀x)φK :=
∧
x∈V (S)
JφK
We write V (S) |= φ to mean JφK = ⊤. For a collection of formulas, Φ, we
write V (S) |= Φ to mean V (S) |= φ for all φ ∈ Φ.
Theorem 3.7 (Gambino). Let S be a set presentable formal topology. Then
V (S) |= CZF
Proof. See [8].
3.2 Some Absoluteness Lemmas
For some of the results later, it will be important that under certain conditions
statements that hold in the background universe also hold internally in the
topological model and vice versa. To this end, we prove a series of absoluteness
lemmas below.
First note that any set x can be viewed as an element of V (S), xˆ as follows.
dom(xˆ) := x
xˆ(y) := ⊤ for all y ∈ x
Lemma 3.8. In the below, let φ and ψ be any formulas, possibly with parameters
from V (S).
1. We can prove in CZF that for any set x, Jφ(yˆ)K = ⊤ holds for all y in x
if and only if J(∀y ∈ xˆ)φ(y)K = ⊤ holds.
2. JφK ⊆ JψK if and only if Jφ→ ψK = ⊤.
3. JφK = ⊤ and JψK = ⊤ if and only if Jφ ∧ ψK = ⊤.
4. For proper formal topologies, J⊥K = ∅.
5. If (∃y ∈ x) Jφ(yˆ)K = ⊤ then J(∃y ∈ xˆ)φ(y)K = ⊤.
6. If JφK = ⊤ or JψK = ⊤ then Jφ ∨ ψK = ⊤.
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Proof. For 1, 2 and 3 note that joins and implications in the Heyting algebra
on ⊳-closed classes are exactly the usual joins and implications for the Heyting
algebra of subsets of a set. 1, 2 and 3 follow by the basic properties of Heyting
algebras.
4 is just by unfolding definitions.
For 5, note that we have
J(∃y ∈ xˆ)φ(y)K = J
(⋃
y∈x
Jφ(yˆ)K
)
However, we also have ⋃
y∈x
Jφ(yˆ)K ⊆ J
(⋃
y∈x
Jφ(yˆ)K
)
Then 5 easily follows.
One can then prove 6 by a similar argument.
Lemma 3.9. Suppose that (
⋃
x Jφ(xˆ)K) ⊆ JψK. Then J((∃x)φ(x)) → ψK = ⊤.
Suppose that JφK ∨ JψK ⊆ JχK. Then Jφ ∨ ψ → χK = ⊤.
Proof. Suppose that (
⋃
x Jφ(xˆ)K) ⊆ JψK. Then we have
J
(⋃
x
Jφ(xˆ)K
)
⊆ J (JψK)
However, JψK is already ⊳-closed, so J(JψK) = JψK. But then it easily follows
that J(∃x)φ(x)K ⊆ JψK and so J((∃x)φ(x)) → ψK = ⊤.
The other part can be proved by a similar argument.
Lemma 3.10. Let x and y be sets and let z ∈ V (S). Then,
Jz ∈ {̂x, y} ↔ z = xˆ ∨ z = yˆJ = ⊤ (1)
Jz ∈
⋃̂
x ↔ (∃w ∈ xˆ) z ∈ wK = ⊤ (2)
Proof. We first check (1). Unfolding definitions we have that both Jz ∈ {̂x, y}K
and Jz = xˆ ∨ z = yˆK are equal to j(Jz = xˆK ∪ Jz = yˆK). It easily follows that (1)
holds.
We now check (2). Unfolding definitions we have the following.
Jz ∈
⋃̂
xK = j(
⋃
v∈x
⋃
w∈v
Jz = wˆK)
J(∃w ∈ xˆ) z ∈ wK = j(
⋃
v∈x
j(
⋃
w∈v
Jz = wˆK))
By monotonicity of j and union we have Jz ∈
⋃̂
xK ⊆ J(∃w ∈ xˆ) z ∈ wK. We
now check Jz ∈
⋃̂
xK ⊇ J(∃w ∈ xˆ) z ∈ wK. By axiom 3 of the definition of formal
topology, it suffices to check that
⋃
v∈x j(
⋃
w∈vJz = wˆK) ⊆ j(
⋃
v∈x
⋃
w∈vJz =
wˆK). Let a ∈
⋃
v∈x j(
⋃
w∈vJz = wˆK). Then for some v ∈ x, we have a ∈
j(
⋃
w∈vJz = wˆK). But now a ∈ j(
⋃
v′∈x
⋃
w∈v′Jz = wˆK by monotonicity of j, as
required.
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Lemma 3.11. The natural numbers are absolute, in the following sense.
J(∀u) [u ∈ Nˆ ↔ (∅ = u ∨ (∃v ∈ Nˆ)u = v ∪ {v})]K = ⊤
Proof. First note that J(∀u ∈ Nˆ)u ∩ {u} ∈ NˆK =
⋂
u∈NJuˆ ∪ {uˆ} ∈ NˆK but this is
equal to ⊤ by lemma 3.10 and the fact that {u} ∪ u ∈ N for every u ∈ N. We
also easily have J∅ ∈ NˆK. But we have now shown one half of the bi-implication:
J(∀u) [u ∈ Nˆ → (∅ = u ∨ (∃v ∈ Nˆ)u = v ∪ {v})]K = ⊤
Now assume that for some v ∈ N, a ∈ Ju = vˆ ∪ {vˆ}K. Then using the
soundness of the laws of equality, we have Ju = vˆ∪{vˆ}K∩Jvˆ∪{vˆ} ∈ NˆK ⊆ Ju ∈ NˆK.
Hence a ∈ Ju ∈ NˆK. But we now apply both parts of lemma 3.9 to deduce
J(∀u) [u ∈ Nˆ ← (∅ = u ∨ (∃v ∈ Nˆ)u = v ∪ {v})]K = ⊤
which is the other half of the bi-implication we require.
Lemma 3.12. Suppose that 〈S,≤, ⊳〉 is a proper formal topology. Then equality
and membership are absolute for the natural numbers in the following sense. For
every m,n ∈ N, we have that either Jmˆ = nˆK = ⊤ or Jmˆ = nˆK = ∅, m = n if
and only if Jmˆ = nˆK = ⊤, either Jmˆ ∈ nˆK = ⊤ or Jmˆ ∈ nˆK = ∅ and m ∈ n if
and only if Jmˆ ∈ nˆK = ⊤.
Proof. These are proved simultaneously by induction on n and m.
Lemma 3.13. Finite tuples are absolute, in the following sense. We can show
in CZF that for every set x and every n ∈ N and every set z,
Jz ∈ x̂n ↔ z ∈ xˆnˆK = ⊤
Proof. This can be proved by induction on n.
Lemma 3.14. Let x be a set. Then function application for Nx is absolute,
in the sense that for f ∈ Nx, z ∈ x and n ∈ N, f(z) = n if and only if
Jfˆ(zˆ) = nˆK = ⊤.
Proof. Note that the formula fˆ(zˆ) = nˆ is equivalent to the following
(∀w ∈ fˆ)(∀v ∈ xˆ)(∀u ∈ Nˆ)w = 〈v, u〉 → u = nˆ
This is clearly absolute by the previous lemmas.
Remark 3.15. In [8] it is stated that all restricted formulas are absolute. This
is not provable in IZF or CZF, since the converses to parts 5 and 6 of lemma
3.8 do not hold in general and atomic formulas are not in general absolute. The
double negation formal topology provides a counterexample, as do the formal
topologies Ln considered in this paper. Also note that properness is necessary
to show that ⊥ is absolute.
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4 LLPO and LLPOn
4.1 An Alternative Formulation of LLPO
We will first show how LLPO can be formulated in terms of the poset N∞ de-
fined below. This formulation will motivate the definition of the formal topology
as the simplest one making LLPO true in the topological model (based on an
observation of Van Oosten in [22]).
Definition 4.1. Let N∞ be the set of decreasing binary sequences, i.e.
N∞ := {α : N→ 2 | (∀i ≤ j)α(j) ≤ α(i)}
We will consider N∞ as a poset with the pointwise ordering, i.e. α ≤ β if
for all i ∈ N, α(i) ≤ β(i).
Proposition 4.2. If α, β ∈ N∞, then the join α ∨ β exists and is defined
pointwise, i.e. for i ∈ N
(α ∨ β)(i) := α(i) ∨ β(i)
Hence, if F is a finitely enumerable subset of N∞, then
∨
F exists and is
defined pointwise.
The top element of N∞ is the function constantly equal to 1. We’ll write
this function as 1.
Lemma 4.3. For all α ∈ N∞, we have ¬¬α = 1→ α = 1.
Proof. Suppose ¬¬α = 1. For each i ∈ N, we have that α(i) is either 0 or 1.
But if α(i) = 0, then we would have ¬α = 1, contradicting ¬¬α = 1. Hence
α(i) = 1 for all i ∈ N, and so α = 1.
Lemma 4.4. Assume Markov’s principle. Suppose that F ⊆ N∞ is a finitely
enumerable set such that
∧
F 6= 1. Then for some α ∈ F , α 6= 1.
Proof. Suppose
∧
F 6= 1. Then by Markov’s principle, there is some n such
that
∧
F(n) = 0. However, we now clearly have α(n) = 0 for some α ∈ F (since
{α(n) | α ∈ F} is a finitely enumerable set of natural numbers), and hence
α 6= 1.
Lemma 4.5. Assume Markov’s principle. Suppose that F ⊆ N∞ is a finitely
enumerable set such that for each α ∈ F , α 6= 1. Then
∨
F 6= 1.
Proof. Since F is finitely enumerable, we can write F = {α1, . . . , αk}. By
Markov’s principle we have for each i, ni such that αi(ni) = 0. Take N :=
maxi ni. Then we have that (
∨
F)(N) = 0 and therefore
∨
F 6= 1.
Recall that LLPO is usually formulated as below.
Definition 4.6. The lesser limited principle of omniscience (LLPO) is the
following axiom. Let α : N→ 2 be a binary sequence such that for all i, j ∈ N,
if α(i) = α(j) = 1 then i = j. Then either for all i ∈ N, α(2i) = 0, or for all
i ∈ N α(2i+ 1) = 0.
8
We now obtain the equivalent presentations of LLPO below.
Proposition 4.7. The following are equivalent:
1. LLPO
2. for all α, β ∈ N∞, if α ∨ β = 1, then α = 1 or β = 1
3. for all inhabited finitely enumerable sets F ⊆ N∞, if
∨
F = 1, then there
exists α ∈ F such that α = 1
Proof. To show 1 ⇒ 2, let α, β ∈ N∞ be such that α ∨ β = 1. Then define
γ : N→ 2 as below.
γ(i) =

1 if i = 2j, α(j) = 1 and α(j + 1) = 0
1 if i = 2j + 1, β(j) = 1 and β(j + 1) = 0
0 otherwise
Then by applying LLPO to γ, we can show either α = 1 or β = 1.
Now to show 2⇒ 1, let γ : N→ 2 be such that for all i, j if γ(i) = γ(j) = 1,
then i = j. Define α and β as follows.
α(i) =
{
1 for all j ≤ i, γ(2j) = 0
0 for some j ≤ i, γ(2j) = 1
β(i) =
{
1 for all j ≤ i, γ(2j + 1) = 0
0 for some j ≤ i, γ(2j + 1) = 1
Then one can easily check that α ∨ β = 1, and if α = 1 then γ(2i) = 0 for all i,
and if β = 1 then γ(2i+ 1) = 0 for all i.
Finally note that 2 is a special case of 3, and that 3 follows from 2 by
showing by induction on n that the result holds for all F that admit a surjection
n։ F .
4.2 Generalising to LLPOn
In [19], Richman considered for each n ≥ 2 a variant of LLPO, that he denoted
LLPOn. These axioms were also studied by Hendtlass and Lubarsky, who
showed (amongst other results) that LLPOn+1 is strictly weaker than LLPOn.
In this section we show that like LLPO, LLPOn can also be formulated using
N∞.
Definition 4.8. Let n ≥ 2. LLPOn is the following statement: Let α : N→ 2
be a binary sequence such that for all i, j ∈ N, α(i) = α(j) = 1 implies i = j.
Then there is some k with 0 ≤ k < n such that for all i, α(in+ k) = 0.
Remark 4.9. In [3] Akama, Hayashi, Berardi and Kohlenbach studied a sepa-
rate hierarchy of variants of LLPO, denoted Σ0n−LLPO. They show (amongst
other results) that for each n, Σ0n+1 − LLPO is strictly stronger than Σ
0
n −
LLPO. Another variant of Lifschitz realizability (relativised to ∆0n functions)
was used for one of their separation results.
We now give the equivalent formulation using N∞.
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Proposition 4.10. Let n ≥ 2. The following are equivalent:
1. LLPOn
2. Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ N∞ be such that for all i, j with 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, αi∨αj =
1. Then there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that αi = 1.
Proof. Similar to the proof of proposition 4.7.
We now aim towards another characterisation of LLPOn analogous to part
3 of proposition 4.7 that will be useful later.
Definition 4.11. For each n, we define the set of n-trees by the following
recursive definition.
1. There is an n-tree nil.
2. If we have a list of n-trees T1, . . . , Tn and a list of decreasing sequences
α1, . . . , αn ∈ N∞, then Tr(T1, . . . , Tn;α1, . . . , αn) is an n-tree.
Definition 4.12. An n-tree is defined to be good according to the following
recursive definition.
1. nil is good.
2. Tr(Ti;αi) is good if for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, αi ∨ αj = 1, and for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n, if αi = 1 then Ti is good.
Definition 4.13. An n-tree is defined to be very good according to the following
inductive definition.
1. nil is very good.
2. Tr(Ti;αi) is very good if it is good, and for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, αi = 1 and
Ti is very good.
Theorem 4.14. LLPOn is equivalent to the statement that every good n-tree
is very good.
Proof. We first assume that every good n-tree is very good and deduce LLPOn.
Let α1, . . . , αn ∈ N∞ be such that for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, αi ∨ αj = 1. Then
note that we can form a good n-tree Tr(nil;αi). If Tr(nil;αi) is very good,
then for some i, αi = 1, as required.
For the converse, we assume LLPOn and prove by induction that for every
n-tree, T , if T is good then T is very good.
For nil, this is clear.
For T = Tr(Ti;αi), assume that T is good. Then for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n we have
αi ∨αj = 1. Hence, for some i, αi = 1 by LLPOn. Since T is good and αi = 1,
we have that Ti is good. But by induction we may assume now that Ti is very
good. Hence, T is also very good.
Definition 4.15. LLPO∞ is the following statement. Let (, ) : N×N→ N be
a surjective pairing function, and let α : N→ 2 be a binary sequence such that
α(i) = 1 for at most one n. Then for some k ∈ N, and for all n ∈ N α(k, n) = 0.
Proposition 4.16. LLPO∞ is equivalent to the following statement. Let
(αi)i∈N be such that αi ∈ N∞ for each i ∈ N. Suppose further that for i 6= j,
αi ∨ αj = 1. Then for some i, αi = 1.
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4.3 Absoluteness Results for n-Trees
We next show how to encode n-trees as functions N→ N.
Definition 4.17. Let T be an n-tree. We define the shape of T , S(T ) ∈ N
as follows. Assume that we have a standard way of encoding lists of natural
numbers as natural numbers such that encoding and decoding can be done in
a primitive recursive manner and the code for a list is greater than each of its
elements, and write this using brackets ().
1. S(nil) is defined to be ().
2. S(Tr(Ti;αi)) is defined to be (S(T1), . . . , S(Tn)).
We define the data for T , D(T ) ∈ 2N as follows.
1. D(nil)(j) := 0 for all j ∈ N.
2. We define D(Tr(Ti;αi)) as follows. For any j ∈ N, j can be written
uniquely as either 2nk + 2i or 2nk + 2i+ 1 where 0 ≤ i < n. We define
D(Tr(Ti;αi))(2nk + 2i) := αi(k)
D(Tr(Ti;αi))(2nk + 2i+ 1) := D(Ti)(k)
Lemma 4.18. There are primitive recursive functions b, c, f , g0 and g1 such
that an n-tree T is good if and only if
∀l < b(S(T )) (c(l, S(T )) = 1 → (∀i ∈ N) D(T )(f(l, S(T ), i)) = 1) →
(∀i ∈ N)¬(D(T )(g0(l, S(T ), i)) = 0 ∧D(T )(g1(l, S(T ), i)) = 0) (3)
Proof. We define b(S(nil)) to be 0. We can then take c, f, g0, g1 to be anything
(e.g. constantly equal to 0).
We now deal with the case T = Tr(Ti;αi). We define
b(S(Tr(T1, . . . , Tn;α1, . . . , αn)) :=
n∑
i=1
b(S(Ti)) + n(n− 1)
Now given l < b(S(T1, . . . , Tn;α1, . . . , αn)) we have one of the following two
cases (and we can decide which in a primitive recursive manner).
1. For some (unique) 0 ≤ l0 < n and 0 ≤ l1 < n − 1, l =
∑n
i=1 b(S(Ti)) +
nl0 + (l1 − 1).
2. For some 1 ≤ k ≤ n and 0 ≤ l′ < b(S(Tk)), l =
∑k−1
i=1 b(S(Ti)) + l
′,
and this is unique when we require furthermore that k is the greatest such
value.
For case 1, we take c(l, S(T )) := 0. The value of f now makes no difference,
so we take it to be constantly 0. Now write l′1 for l1 if l1 < l0 and l1+1 if l1 ≥ l0
(so that in any case we have 0 ≤ l′1 < n and l0 6= l
′
1). We define
g0(l, S(T ), i) := 2ni+ 2l0
g1(l, S(T ), i) := 2ni+ 2l
′
1
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(This corresponds to ensuring that αl0 ∨ αl′1 = 1)
For case 2, we define c(l, S(T )) := 1. Let l′ and k be as in the description
of case 2. We split into cases on whether or not c(S(Tk)) = 1. If c(S(Tk)) = 1,
then define
f(l, S(T ), 2i) := 2ni+ 2k
f(l, S(T ), 2i+ 1) := 2nf(l′, S(Tk), i) + 2k + 1
If c(S(Tk)) 6= 1, then define
f(l, S(T ), i) := 2ni+ k
In either case, we define
g0(l, S(T ), i) := 2ng0(l
′, S(Tk), i) + 2k + 1
g1(l, S(T ), i) := 2ng1(l
′, S(Tk), i) + 2k + 1
(This corresponds to ensuring that if αk(j) = 1 for all j then Tk is good.)
Theorem 4.19. Let α : N → N. Then the statement “f is the code of a good
tree” is absolute in V (S), for any proper formal topology S.
Proof. Note that if f is a primitive recursive function, then the formula f(n) =
m is equivalent to one built from bounded universal quantifiers, conjunctions,
⊥ and implication, and hence is absolute. Note that formula (3) is built from
formulas of this form together with function application, bounded universal
quantification implication and negation. Hence it is absolute. We showed in
lemma 4.18 that the statement that α codes a good tree is equivalent to this
formula and so that is also absolute.
Lemma 4.20. There are primitive recursive functions b and f such that for
any n-tree T , T is very good if and only if there is l < b(S(T )) such that for all
i ∈ N D(T )(f(l, S(T ), i)) = 1. Furthermore, assuming Markov’s principle, if for
all l < b(S(T )), there exists i ∈ N such that D(T )(f(l, S(T ), i)) = 0, then T is
not good.
Proof. For T = nil we define b(S(T )) to be 0, so we can take f(l, S(nil), i) to
be anything.
For T = Tr(T1, . . . , Tn;α1, . . . , αn), we define
b(S(T )) :=
n∑
i=1
b(S(Ti))
Then, note that for l < b(S(T )), l can be written as
l =
k∑
i=1
b(S(Ti)) + l
′
where 0 ≤ k < n and 0 ≤ l′ < b(S(Tk)) and this is unique if we require the
greatest such k.
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Then splitting into cases depending on whether the input to f is odd or
even, we define
f(l, S(T ), 2i) := 2ni+ k
f(l, S(T ), 2i+ 1) := 2nf(l′, S(Tk), i) + 2k + 1
Corollary 4.21 (CZF + MP). For any n-tree T , and any list of n-trees
T1, . . . , Tk, we have
1. If T is good, then the double negation of “T is very good” is true.
2. Suppose the following statement is false: Ti is very good for every 1 ≤ i ≤
k. Then for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Ti is not good.
Proof. Note that part 1 follows directly from lemma 4.20.
We now show part 2.
Suppose that it is false that Ti is very good for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We define
a finite sequence α0,1, . . . , α0,k ∈ N∞ using f from lemma 4.20 by,
α0,i(j) := f(0, S(Ti), j)
Note that we cannot have α0,i = 1 for all i, since then each Ti would be very
good. Hence by Markov’s principle, there is some i0 such that α0,i0 6= 1. We
then define α1,i by
α1,i(j) :=
{
α0,i(j) i 6= i0
f(1, S(Ti), j) otherwise
Then, repeating the same argument as before, we find i1 such that α1,i1 6= 1.
We continue this process until reach n such that in = b(S(Tin) − 1. At this
point, we have found j such that f(l, S(Tin), j) 6= 1 for every l < b(S(Tin)) and
hence can apply lemma 4.20 to show that Tin is not good.
5 Some Special Cases of Independence of Pre-
misses
In this section we define a family of variants of independence of premisses (IP).
The motivation for this it that it allows us to easily state some special cases
of IP that hold in certain realizability models and are needed to construct the
formal topologies we will use later.
Definition 5.1. Let Φ(x, y) be a formula with only x and y free variables and
Ψ(z) a formula with only z as a free variable. We will think of Ψ as a class, and
write z ∈ Ψ to mean Ψ(z). We think of Φ(x, y) as a class of pairs and write
〈x, y〉 ∈ Φ to mean Φ(x, y).
Write IPΦ,Ψ for the following axiom schema. For any formula φ,
〈x, y〉 ∈ Φ → ((∀u ∈ y)(∃v ∈ Ψ)φ) → ((∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ Ψ) (u ∈ y → φ))
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Lemma 5.2. Let X and Y be definable sets. By viewing them as classes in the
usual way, we can define IPΦ,X and IPΦ,Y . If there are (provably and definably)
functions f : X → Y and g : Y → X such that f ◦ g = 1Y , then IPΦ,X implies
IPΦ,Y .
Proof. We want to show
〈x, y〉 ∈ Φ → ((∀u ∈ y)(∃v ∈ Y )φ) → ((∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ Y ) (u ∈ y → φ))
So assume that x, y ∈ Φ and ((∀u ∈ y)(∃v ∈ Y )φ). Note that we can define a
formula φ′(u,w) equivalent to φ(u, f(w)) and show
(∀u ∈ y)(∃w ∈ X)φ′
This is because for every u ∈ y, we have some v ∈ Y such that φ(v), but we can
then take w to be g(v). Then since f(w) = f(g(v)) = v, we have φ(u, f(w)).
Now applying IPΦ,X , we have
(∀u ∈ x)(∃w ∈ X) (u ∈ y → φ′)
Taking v to be f(w), we have
(∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ Y ) (u ∈ y → φ)
But we have now proved IPΦ,Y , as required.
5.1 The Schema IPFn,NN
We now come to the special cases, IPFn,NN , of IPΦ,Ψ that we will need to
construct the formal topologies later.
Definition 5.3. Let n ∈ N. Define Fn to be the class of pairs 〈x, y〉 where x is of
the form {α1, . . . , αn} where α1, . . . , αn ∈ N∞ such that for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n,
αi ∨ αj = 1 and y = x ∩ {1}.
Then viewing NN as a class, we define IPFn,NN according to definition 5.1.
It is important to note that IPFn,NN implies several variants, that will also
be used throughout this paper. Where it is clear from context, we will write
that we invoke IPFn,NN when we actually mean one of the variants listed below.
Proposition 5.4. IPFn,NN implies IPFn,N, IPFn,List(NN), IPFn,Tn and IPFn,List(Tn)
where we write List(X) for the set of finite lists of elements of X and Tn to mean
the set of n-trees.
Proof. One can easily define suitable functions to apply lemma 5.2. For n-trees
we use the “shape and data” encoding from definition 4.17.
Lemma 5.5. LLPOn implies IPFn,Ψ for any Ψ (and in particular LLPOn
implies IPFn,NN).
Proof. Suppose that x = {α1, . . . , αn} where αi ∨ αj = 1 for i 6= j and such
that for all u ∈ x ∩ {1} there exists v ∈ Ψ such that φ(u, v).
By LLPOn, we know that αi = 1 for some i. However, this implies that
1 ∈ u ∩ {1}, so there must exist v ∈ Ψ such that φ(1, v). Note that we trivially
have that u = 1 implies φ(u, v), and so we have now proved this instance of
IPFn,Ψ.
14
5.2 IPFn,NN in V (K1)
We now check that IPFn,NN actually holds in the most basic realizability model
for set theory, V (K1), developed by McCarty in [13]. The proof uses a key idea
that is already implicit in Lifschitz’s original presentation of Lifschitz realizabil-
ity [11] and also appears the newer versions by Van Oosten [21].
Lemma 5.6 (CZF +MP). IPFn,NN holds in V (K1). In fact, a more general
version holds. Let Φ be the class of pairs 〈x, y〉 with x any subset of NN and
y = x ∩ {1} (writing 1 for the function constantly equal to 1). Then IPΦ,NN
holds in V (K1).
Proof. Note firstly that we can show in CZF that for any f ∈ NN, ¬¬f = 1
implies f = 1. Hence, we can replace y by {f ∈ x | ¬¬f = 1}.
We are given a0, a1 ∈ K1 such that
a0  (∀u ∈ x)u ∈ N
N
a1  (∀u ∈ x) ¬¬u = 1→ (∃v ∈ N
N)φ
and need to construct computably b ∈ K1 such that
b  (∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ NN) ¬¬u = 1→ φ
Note that for any formula ψ, we have c  ¬ψ for some c ∈ K1 if and only
if c  ¬ψ for every c ∈ K1. Hence, if c  ¬¬u = 1 for some c ∈ K1, then
0  u = 1.
Now let 〈d, u〉 ∈ x. Note that (a0d)0 is a code for a total computable function.
We define a new computable function as follows. Given input n, in parallel, run
the following two algorithms.
First algorithm: For eachm in turn, evaluate (a0d)0m. If (a0d)0m 6= 1, then
halt and return 0. Otherwise, continue running.
Second algorithm: Try to evaluate a1d0. If this is successful, then try to
evaluate (a1d0)0n. If this is successful, then halt and return (a1d0)0n.
Let n ∈ K1. Suppose that neither of these algorithms halts. Then in particu-
lar, for all m, (a0d)0m = 1. However, we would then have 0  ¬¬u = 1 and so
a1d0 must be defined, with (a1d0)0 a total computable function. This implies
that the second algorithm halts successfully, giving a contradiction. Hence by
MP one of the algorithms must halt, and so we get a total computable function.
Note that we did this uniformly in d, so in fact we have b0 ∈ K1 such that for
each 〈d, u〉 ∈ x, b0d denotes and is a total computable function defined as above.
Now define b such that for every d ∈ K1,
bd = p(b0d)(λz.(a1d0)1)
Note first that for any 〈d, u〉 ∈ x, bd ↓, since b0d ↓ and for any term t, λz.t
denotes (even if t does not). Furthermore, as shown above, (bd)0 is always a
total computable function. In particular, we have 〈(bd)0, (bd)0〉 ∈ NN, where
(bd)0 is the function in V (K1) represented by (bd)0, and NN is the standard
implementation of NN in V (K1).
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Now suppose that for some c ∈ K1, c  ¬¬u = 1. In particular, this implies
that for every m, (a0d)0m = 1. Then the first algorithm above never halts.
Hence we must have that for every n, b0dn = (a0d0)0n, and so b0d = (a0d0)0.
But, we also have (a1d0)1  φ[v/(a0d0)0]. Therefore we have established that
(bd)1c  φ[v/b0d]
and so
b  (∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ NN) ¬¬u = 1→ φ
as required. Finally, note that we constructed b uniformly in a, so we do indeed
have a realizer for the implication
((∀u ∈ y)(∃v ∈ NN)φ) → ((∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ NN) (u ∈ y → φ))
5.3 IPFn,NN in Realizability with Truth
We now do the same thing for realizability with truth. For this to work we this
time need to assume that IPFn,NN holds already in the background universe
(which was not needed for V (K1)).
Lemma 5.7 (CZF +MP + IPFn,NN). IPFn,NN holds in the realizability with
truth model V ∗ studied in [16].
Proof. Let V ∗ be the realizability with truth model from [16]. We will construct,
for each instance ψ of IPFn,NN a closed application term tψ such that tψ tr ψ.
Recall from the proof of lemma 5.6, that each instance of IPFn,NN is equiv-
alent to a formula of the following form.
(∀x ∈ Fn)((∀u ∈ x)¬¬u = 1→ (∃v ∈ N
N)φ) →
((∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ NN)¬¬u = 1→ φ) (4)
Finding a realizer for this formula amounts to
1. Showing that the implication is true
2. Constructing a such that whenever
b tr (∀x ∈ Fn)((∀u ∈ x)¬¬u = 1→ (∃v ∈ N
N)φ) (5)
ab is defined, and
ab tr (∀u ∈ x)(∃v ∈ N
N)¬¬u = 1→ φ (6)
To show 1, we simply apply IPFn,NN in the background.
For 2, let b be as in (5). We need to construct a realizer as in (6). Since the
formula is of the form (∀u ∈ x)ψ, we need to show (∀u ∈ x◦)(∃v ∈ NN)¬¬u =
1→ φ◦ and construct ab such that for any 〈d, u〉 ∈ x,
abd tr (∃v ∈ N
N)¬¬u = 1→ φ
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For the truth part, we once again apply IPFn,NN in the background. For the
realizability part, we follow the same proof as for lemma 5.6 to construct a total
computable function f .
Finally, we need to construct a realizer for
¬¬u = 1→ φ[v/f ]
Since, this is an implication, it once again consists of both a realizability part
and a truth part. However, by [16, Lemma 5.10] we have that if ¬¬u◦ = 1 is
true, then 0 tr ¬¬u = 1. Hence, we can apply the proof used in lemma 5.6
for both parts, and therefore the same realizer constructed there still works for
this case.
Theorem 5.8. Let T be one of the theories CZF, CZF+REA, IZF, IZF+
REA. Then T +MP + IPFn,NN has the numerical existence property and is
closed under Church’s rule.
Proof. Using lemma 5.7, the proof of [16, Theorem 1.2] now applies here.
5.4 IPFn,NN in Function Realizability Models
We now check that the same axioms, IPFn,NN , also hold in function realizability
models.
Lemma 5.9 (CZF +MP). There is α ∈ K2 such that the following holds.
Suppose that β ∈ K2 is such that for all γ ∈ K2 if γ(n) = 1 for all n ∈ N, then
βγ ↓. Then,
1. αβ ↓.
2. For all γ ∈ K2, αβγ ↓.
3. If γ(n) = 1 for all n ∈ N, then (βγ ↓ by assumption and) αβγ = βγ.
Proof. We define α so that for each β, αβ is as follows.
αβ(〈n,m1, . . . ,mk〉) =
{
1 if mi 6= 1 for some i ≤ k
β(〈n,m1, . . . ,mk〉) otherwise
Note that there is such an α since this is clearly continuous in β and any
continuous function is representable in K2. Also, note that by unfolding the
definition of application in K2 and applying MP one can show that α is as
required.
Lemma 5.10 (CZF +MP). Let V P be the function realizability model from
[15]. Let Φ be the class of pairs 〈x, y〉 with x any subset of NN and y = x ∩ {1}
(writing 1 for the function constantly equal to 1). Then IPΦ,NN (and hence also
IPFn,NN for each n) holds in V
P.
Proof. One can easily use lemma 5.9 to adapt the proof of lemma 5.6 to work
over K2.
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6 The Topological Models V (Ln)
We now define the topological models.
In this section, we will assume a fixed n throughout, and refer to n-trees
simply as trees.
6.1 Definition of Ln
In this section we define the formal topologies that we will use for the topological
models and check that they are in fact formal topologies. The basic idea is to
use the formulation of LLPOn in terms of trees to produce the simplest formal
topology where LLPOn holds in the respective topological model, even when it
does not hold in the background universe. This is based on the observation of
Van Oosten in [22] that the Lifschitz realizability topos is the largest subtopos
of the effective topos where an axiom equivalent to LLPO in the presence of
Church’s thesis holds.
Definition 6.1. Let T be a tree. Then we define the cover from T , Cover(T ) ⊆
{0}, inductively as follows.
1. Cover(nil) = {0}
2. Cover(Tr(Ti;αi)) =
⋃n
i=1{0 ∈ Cover(Ti) | αi = 1}
Lemma 6.2. Let T be a good tree. Then 0 ∈ Cover(T ) if and only if T is very
good.
Proof. We show this by induction on trees.
For T = nil, we have both 0 ∈ Cover(T ) and T is very good, so the result
is clear.
Now suppose that T = Tr(Ti;αi). If T is very good then for some i, αi = 1
and Ti is very good. However, if Ti is very good, then 0 ∈ Cover(Ti) by the
induction hypothesis, and so, we have 0 ∈ Cover(T ). We have shown that if T
is very good then 0 ∈ Cover(T ). Now suppose that 0 ∈ Cover(T ). Then for
some i, αi = 1 and 0 ∈ Cover(Ti). The latter implies Ti is very good by the
induction hypothesis, and so by the former T is very good, as required.
Proposition 6.3 (CZF +MP). Let T be a good tree. Then we have ¬¬0 ∈
CoverT .
Proof. Suppose that T is a good tree and that 0 /∈ Cover(T ). Since 0 /∈
Cover(T ), we have by lemma 6.2 that T is not very good. Then by corol-
lary 4.21 we have that T is not good, giving us a contradiction. Hence we have
¬¬0 ∈ CoverT as required.
Definition 6.4. Let S,≤ be the poset with S = {0}. Define the relation ⊳ as
follows. 0 ⊳ p precisely if Cover(T ) ⊆ p for some good tree, T . Write Ln for the
tuple 〈S,≤, ⊳〉 (we will show that this is a formal topology).
Lemma 6.5 (CZF+MP). Ln satisfies axioms 1, 2 and 4 in the definition of
formal topology.
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Proof. 1 and 2 are clear. It remains to prove 4, that is, that whenever 0 ⊳ p and
0 ⊳ q, we have 0 ⊳ p ∩ q.
Fix a good tree, T . We will show by induction that for any tree S, there is
a tree R such that Cover(R) ⊆ Cover(T )∩Cover(S), and that if S is good then
R is also good.
For S = nil, we just take R to be T .
Now suppose that S = Tr(Si;αi). Then we have for each i, a tree Ri such
that Cover(Ri) ⊆ Cover(T )∩Cover(Si) and Ri is good if Si is good. Define R to
be the tree Tr(Ri;αi). Suppose that 0 ∈ Cover(R). Then for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n we
must have αi = 1 and 0 ∈ Cover(Ri). Since Cover(Ri) ⊆ Cover(T )∩Cover(Si),
we also have 0 ∈ Cover(Si) and 0 ∈ Cover(T ). But, now recalling that αi = 1,
the former implies 0 ∈ Cover(S). Hence, Cover(R) ⊆ Cover(T ) ∩ Cover(S).
Now suppose that S is good. Then we have that for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n,
αi ∨ αj = 1. Also, for any i, if αi = 1, then Si is good. But this then implies
that Ri is good. Hence R is also good.
We can now easily deduce axiom 4.
Theorem 6.6 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN). Ln is a formal topology.
Proof. We have already shown in lemma 6.5 that axioms 1, 2 and 4 hold. It
remains to show that axiom 3 holds. That is, whenever 0 ⊳ p and p ⊳ q, we have
0 ⊳ q.
Fix q ⊆ {0}. We show the following by induction on trees. Let T be a tree.
Suppose that T is good and whenever 0 ∈ Cover(T ) we have 0 ⊳ q. Then there
is a good tree S such that Cover(S) ⊆ q.
First assume T = nil. Then 0 ∈ Cover(T ), and so we have 0 ⊳ q. Let S be
any good tree such that Cover(S) ⊆ q.
Now assume that T = Tr(Ti;αi). Assume that T is good and whenever
0 ∈ Cover(T ) we have 0⊳q. Since T is good, we have that for any 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n,
αi ∨ αj = 1. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n be such that αi = 1. Then Ti is good, and
Cover(Ti) ⊆ Cover(T ). The latter implies that whenever 0 ∈ Cover(Ti) we have
0 ⊳ q and so we may apply the induction hypothesis, to show there exists S such
that Cover(S) ⊆ q.
However, we can now apply IPFn,NN to find for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a tree Si
such that if αi = 1 then Si is good and Cover(Si) ⊆ q. Define S to be Tr(Si;αi).
Then whenever i is such that αi = 1, we have that Si is good, and so S must
be good. Suppose that 0 ∈ Cover(S). Then for some i we have αi = 1 and
0 ∈ Cover(Si). Hence also 0 ∈ q. But we have now shown Cover(S) ⊆ q as
required.
6.2 Some Basic Properties of Ln and V
(Ln)
Lemma 6.7 (CZF+MP). If LLPOn is true, then we have
1. V (Ln) is isomorphic to the class of all sets, V .
2. V (Ln) |= φ if and only if φ is true.
Proof. By LLPOn, we know that every good n-tree is very good. Hence, in this
case Ln reduces to the trivial formal topology, where for every p ⊆ {0}, 0 ⊳ p if
and only if 0 ∈ p. The result clearly follows.
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Lemma 6.8 (CZF +MP + IPFn,NN). For each j ∈ N, let pj be a subset of
{0}. Suppose that 0 ⊳
⋃
j∈N pj. Then there is some finite set J ⊆ N such that
0 ⊳
⋃
j∈J pj. (That is, Ln is countably compact.)
Proof. We show by induction on trees, that for every tree T , if T is good and
Cover(T ) ⊆
⋃
j∈N pj then there exists a finite set J ⊆ N and another good tree
S such that Cover(S) ⊆
⋃
j∈J pj.
For T = nil, we have 0 ∈
⋃
j∈N pj and so for some j ∈ N, 0 ∈ pj . Hence we
can just take J := {j} and S = nil.
Now suppose T = Tr(Ti;αi). Note that if 1 ≤ i ≤ n is such that αi = 1,
then Ti is good and Cover(Ti) ⊆ Cover(T ) ⊆
⋃
j∈N pj . So by the induction
hypothesis, there is a finite set J and a good tree S such that Cover(S) ⊆⋃
j∈J pj . Hence we can apply IPFn,NN to find for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, a finite set
Ji ⊆ N and a tree Si such that if αi = 1 then Si is good and Cover(Si) ⊆⋃
j∈Ji
pj . We then take J :=
⋃n
i=1 Ji and S := Tr(Si;αi) and note these are as
required.
Lemma 6.9 (CZF +MP + IPFn,NN). Suppose that V
(Ln) |= (∃j ∈ N)φ(j).
Then there is some finite J ⊆ N such that V (Ln) |= (∃j ∈ Jˆ)φ(j).
Proof. Apply lemma 6.8 with pj := Jφ(jˆ)K for j ∈ N.
The following lemma will be key to showing later that certain choice axioms
and existence properties hold. It appears to be related to the constructions
developed by Lee and Van Oosten in [10, Sections 4 and 5]. We will return to
this point in section 8.1.
Lemma 6.10 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN). Let 1 ≤ k < n and for each j ∈ N, let
pj be a subset of {0}. Suppose that 0⊳
⋃
j∈N pj (relative to Ln). Suppose further
that for every J ⊆ N such that J is finite and |J | > k we have
⋂
j∈J pj = ∅.
Then for some j ∈ N there exists a good ⌈n
k
⌉-tree, S such that Cover(S) ⊆ pj
(where ⌈n
k
⌉ means round up n
k
to the next integer).
Proof. We show by induction on trees that for every n-tree, T , if T is good
and Cover(T ) ⊆
⋃
j pj , then there exists j ∈ N and an ⌈
n
k
⌉-tree S such that
Cover(S) ⊆ pj .
For T = nil, we have 0 ∈
⋃
j∈N pj . Hence for some j ∈ N we in fact have
0 ∈ pj . We can then take S to be nil.
Now suppose that T = Tr(Ti;αi).
Suppose that αi = 1. Then Ti is good and Cover(Ti) ⊆
⋃
i pi. So there exist
j ∈ N and S a good ⌈n
k
⌉-tree such that Cover(S) ⊆ pj .
Hence we can apply IPFn,NN to find for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ji ∈ N and an
⌈n
k
⌉-tree Si such that if αi = 1 then Si is good and Cover(Si) ⊆ pji .
Now suppose that |{ji | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| > k. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be such
that |I| = |{ji | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| = |{ji | i ∈ I}| (which exists by finite choice and
decidability of equality for N). By assumption,
⋂
i∈I pi = ∅. Suppose that for all
i ∈ I, αi = 1. Then we would have that each Si is good but
⋂
i∈I Cover(Si) = ∅,
giving a contradiction by corollary 4.21 and lemma 6.2. Hence by lemma 4.4,
for some i, αi 6= 1. Let i′ ∈ I \ {i}. Since αi 6= 1, we vacuously have αi = 1
implies that Cover(Si) ⊆ pj
i′
. Hence we may “replace” ji with ji′ .
20
By repeating the above argument we may assume without loss of generality
that in fact
|{ji | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| ≤ k
Write J for the set {ji | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Now note that we have ∑
j∈J
|{i | ji = j}| = n
Note that if l ∈ N is such that l < ⌈n
k
⌉, then l < n
k
. To show this, see that we
can find p, q ∈ N with 0 ≤ q < k such that n = pk + q by Euclid’s algorithm.
We can then split into cases depending on whether or not q = 0, by decidability
of equality for N. If q = 0, then l < ⌈n
k
⌉ = n
k
. If q > 0, then l ≤ ⌈n
k
⌉ − 1 < n
k
.
So in either case l < n
k
.
Hence, if we had |{i | ji = j}| < ⌈
n
k
⌉ for all j ∈ J , this would imply∑
j∈J |{i | ji = j}| <
n
k
.k = n, giving a contradiction. Hence, for some j ∈ J we
must have |{i | ji = j}| ≥ ⌈
n
k
⌉. Choose such a j, and I ⊆ {i | ji = j} with |I| =
⌈n
k
⌉ and an enumeration of I. Then let S be the ⌈n
k
⌉-tree Tr((αi)i∈I ; (Si)i∈I).
Since T is good and Si is good when αi = 1, S must also be good. Now suppose
0 ∈ Cover(S). This implies that for some i ∈ I, αi = 1 and 0 ∈ Si. But then
also 0 ∈ pj. So Cover(S) ⊆ pj as required.
Remark 6.11. Note that in the above lemma we do not have 0 ⊳ pj relative to
Ln, because we require a good n-tree S, such that Cover(S) ⊆ pj, but have only
a good ⌈n
k
⌉-tree. We do however have ¬¬0 ∈ pj.
Lemma 6.12 (CZF +MP + IPFn,NN). Suppose that for each j ∈ N, pj is
a subset of {0} such that 0 ⊳
⋃
j∈N pj and that for all j 6= j
′ ∈ N we have
pj ∩ pj′ = ∅. Then for some (necessarily unique) j ∈ N we have 0 ∈ pj.
Proof. This is a special case of lemma 6.10 with k = 1.
Lemma 6.13 (CZF +MP + IPFn,NN). Suppose that V
(Ln) |= f ∈ NN. Then
for some g : N→ N, V (Ln) |= f = gˆ.
Proof. We define g : N → N as follows. Let n ∈ N. For each m ∈ N, set
pm := Jf(nˆ) = mˆK. Note that for m 6= m′, we have pm ∩ pm′ = ∅, so we can
apply lemma 6.12 to find m such that 0 ∈ Jf(nˆ) = mˆK. We take g(n) to be this
m.
Note that by construction we have V (Ln) |= (∀n ∈ N) gˆ(n) = f(m), and so
V (Ln) |= gˆ = f .
Lemma 6.14 (CZF +MP + IPFn,NN). Suppose that V
(Ln) |= F : NN → N.
Then for some G : NN → N, V (Ln) |= F = Gˆ.
Proof. First note that by lemma 6.13 we can show that NN is absolute, in the
sense that in V (Ln) we can show that NˆN is the set of functions N→ N. However,
we can now apply the same proof as in lemma 6.13 to get the result.
Lemma 6.15 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN).
V (Ln) |=MP
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Proof. Suppose that f ∈ V (Ln) is such that V (Ln) |= f ∈ 2N ∧ ¬¬(∃x ∈
N) f(x) = 1. Then by lemma 6.13 there is g : N→ 2 such that V (Ln) |= gˆ = f .
Note that ¬¬(∃x ∈ N) gˆ(x) = 1 is equivalent to ¬(∀x ∈ N) gˆ(x) = 0 and so
is absolute. Hence we can apply MP in the background to find m ∈ N such
that g(m) = 1. But then V (Ln) |= (∃x ∈ N) f(x) = 1. Therefore MP holds in
V (Ln).
6.3 LLPOn in V
(Ln)
The motivation for the definition of Ln was to try to write down the simplest
topology where LLPOn holds in the topological model. We now check that in
fact it really is the case that LLPOn holds in V
(Ln). Note that we don’t need
to assume LLPOn holds in the background for this to work, although we did
need IPFn,NN , even just to construct the topological model.
Lemma 6.16 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN).
V (Ln) |= LLPOn
Proof. Suppose that f ∈ V (Ln) is such that internally in V (Ln), f is a function
N → 2 such that f(i) = 1 for at most one i. Then by lemma 6.13 there must
be some (unique) g : N → 2 such that V (Ln) |= gˆ = f . Then by lemma 3.8 we
must have that also g(i) = 1 for at most one i. We now define a tree by setting
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
αk(i) := 1−max
i′≤i
(g(ni′ + (k − 1)))
and then define
T := Tr(nil, . . . , nil;α1, . . . , αn)
We clearly have that T is a good tree and by lemma 3.8 we know
Cover(T ) ⊆
⋃
1≤k≤n
J(∀x ∈ N) f(xn+ (kˆ − 1)) = 0K
Hence
V (Ln) |=
∨
1≤k≤n
(∀x ∈ N) f(xn+ (k − 1)) = 0
But we now have that V (Ln) |= LLPOn as required.
6.4 Bounded Existential Formulas and Countable Choice
in V (Ln)
Although countable choice fails in each V (Ln), there are weaker variants that
we define below that do hold. To formulate them, we first define some notation
for certain bounded existential formulas.
Definition 6.17. Let φ be a formula. We write (∃≤nx)φ as shorthand for the
following formula.
(∃x ∈ N)φ ∧ (∀x1, . . . , xn+1 ∈ N)
∧
i6=j
(xi 6= xj) → ¬
∧
i
φ(xi)

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Informally, this says that there exists a witness of φ(x) in N, but given any
X ⊆ N with |X | = n+1 it is false that every element of X is a witness of φ(x).
In other words φ(x) has at least one, but at most n witnesses.
Definition 6.18. We define the following variants of the axiom of choice. Let
X be any set.
1. WriteACX,k for the following principle. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula
(that may have parameters). Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃≤ky)φ(x, y).
Then there is a function f : X → N such that for every x ∈ X , φ(x, f(x)).
2. WriteACmX,k for the following principle. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula
(that may have parameters). Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃≤ky)φ(x, y).
Then there is a function f : X → N such that for every x ∈ X , there is a
good m-tree, T such that if T is very good then φ(x, f(x)).
3. WriteAC¬¬X,k for the following principle. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula.
Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃≤ky)φ(x, y). Then there is a function
f : X → N such that for all x ∈ X , ¬¬φ(x, f(x)).
Proposition 6.19 (CZF +MP). Let X be any set. For all m, k ∈ N with
m, k ≥ 2, and all m′ ≤ m,
ACX,k ⇒ AC
m
X,k ⇒ AC
m′
X,k ⇒ AC
¬¬
X,k
Proof. For (ACX,k ⇒ AC
m
X,k), note that AC
m
X,k is easily a special case of
ACX,k.
For (ACmX,k ⇒ AC
m′
X,k), given any good m-tree T , we can generate a good
m′-tree by “choosing m′ branches at each level.”
For (ACm
′
X,k ⇒ AC
¬¬
X,k), we just apply corollary 4.21.
Lemma 6.20 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN +ACN,N). Let n, k ∈ N and 2 ≤ k < n.
Then
V (Ln) |= AC
⌈n
k
⌉
N,k
Proof. Let x ∈ N and suppose that 0 ∈ J(∃≤ky)φ(xˆ, y)K. Then we have by
unfolding the interpretation of formulas in V (Ln) and the definition of ∃≤k that,
0 ⊳
⋃
i∈N
Jφ(xˆ, iˆ)K
and for every list i1, . . . , ik+1 ⋂
1≤j≤k+1
Jφ(xˆ, iˆj)K = ∅
Hence, applying lemma 6.10 with pi := Jφ(xˆ, iˆ)K, we have that for every
x ∈ N there exists y ∈ N and a good ⌈n
k
⌉-tree S such that if S is very good then
0 ∈ Jφ(xˆ, yˆ)K.
Now applying ACN,N we get a choice function f : N → N. That is, for
every x ∈ N, there exists a good ⌈n
k
⌉-tree S such that if S is very good then
0 ∈ Jφ(xˆ, ˆf(x))K. For each x ∈ N, let g ∈ NN be a code for the tree S as above.
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Then the statement that g codes a good tree is absolute by theorem 4.19, so
also holds internally.
Also, the statement that g codes a very good tree is equivalent to a formula
of the form (∃x ∈ N)ψ(x), where ψ is negative by lemma 4.20. Hence by lemma
3.9 the statement “gˆ codes a very good tree implies φ(xˆ, ˆf(x))” must also hold
internally.
Finally, we define another variant of choice that will also hold in our model.
This will be denoted Herbrand choice, since it also holds in the Herbrand topos
developed by Van den Berg in [20].
Definition 6.21. We refer to the following principle as HACX,N or Herbrand
countable choice. Let φ(x, y) be a bounded formula (that may have parameters).
Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃y ∈ N)φ(x, y). Then there exists a function f
from X to the set of finite subsets of N, Pfin(N), such that for all x ∈ X there
exists m ∈ f(x) such that φ(x,m).
One can easily show HACX,N can be alternatively formulated as follows.
Proposition 6.22 (CZF). HACX,N is true if and only if the following holds.
Suppose that we have (∀x ∈ X)(∃y ∈ N)φ(x, y). Then there exists a function
f : X → N such that for all x ∈ X there exists m < f(x) such that φ(x,m).
Lemma 6.23 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN +ACN,N).
V (Ln) |= HACN,N
Proof. Suppose that V (Ln) |= (∀x ∈ N)(∃y ∈ N)φ(x, y). Then for every n ∈ N,
we have V (Ln) |= (∃y ∈ N)φ(nˆ, y). By lemma 6.9 there exists a finite set J ⊆ N
such that V (Ln) |= (∃y ∈ Jˆ)φ(nˆ, y). Hence also there exists N ∈ N such that
V (Ln) |= (∃y < Nˆ)φ(nˆ, y). By ACN,N, we deduce that there is a function
f : N → N such that for all n ∈ N, V (Ln) |= (∃y < f̂(n))φ(nˆ, y). Finally by
absoluteness, we deduce V (Ln) |= (∀x ∈ N)(∃y < fˆ(x))φ(x, y), and thereby
V (Ln) |= HACN,N.
7 Applications
7.1 Consistency of Church’s Thesis with LLPOn
A hallmark of Lifschitz realizability, from Lifschitz’s original model for arith-
metic in [11] onwards is that it satisfies both Church’s thesis and LLPO. We
will recover the result from [5] that Church’s thesis and LLPO are compatible
over IZF. Moreover, we will show something even stronger. Certain variants of
the axiom of countable choice are compatible with Church’s thesis and LLPO,
and as n increases, we can show that successively stronger forms of countable
choice are compatible with Church’s thesis and LLPOn.
Lemma 7.1 (CZF+MP+CT!).
V (Ln) |= CT!
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Proof. By lemma 6.13 it suffices to show that for every f ∈ NN, the statement
that f is computable holds in V (Ln). For any f , we have by applying CT! in
the background that there exists e ∈ N such that f = {e}. For every i ∈ N, the
statement that f(i) = {e}(i) is of the form (∃x ∈ N)φ(x) where φ is primitive
recursive. Since this holds in the background universe we must also have for
each i, V (Ln) |= fˆ (ˆi) = {eˆ}(ˆi). Therefore V (Ln) |= (∀x ∈ N) fˆ(x) = {eˆ}(x).
Therefore V (Ln) |= CT! as required.
Theorem 7.2. Assume that CZF is consistent. Then for each n ∈ N, the
following theory is consistent.
CZF+MP+ LLPOn +
∧
2≤k<n
AC
⌈n
k
⌉
N,k +HACN,N +CT!
Assume that IZF is consistent. Then for each n ∈ N, the following theory is
consistent.
IZF+MP+ LLPOn +
∧
2≤k<n
AC
⌈n
k
⌉
N,k +HACN,N +CT!
Proof. Let T be either CZF or IZF and assume that T is consistent. It is
already known that in both casesMP does not change the consistency strength.
(IZF is the same consistency strength as ZF by the main result in [6] and CZF
is the same consistency strength as CZF+ LPO by [18])
So we have that T +MP is consistent. Then so is the theory T +MP +
CT0+ IPFn,NN by working in the McCarty realizability model V (K1) and using
the main results in [13] and [17] together with lemma 5.6.
However we now get the result by building the model V (Ln) in T +MP +
CT0 + IPFn,NN and applying lemmas 6.15, 6.16, 6.20, 6.23 and 7.1.
In [19], Richman gave a proof in Bishop style constructive mathematics that
for each n, LLPOn is inconsistent with the statement that all functions are
computable (that in fact this is even true for LLPO∞). Richman’s argument
does not hold in CZF or even IZF, as is already clear from the earlier Lifschitz
realizability model in [5]. However, it turns out that the only obstacle is an
implicit use of countable choice, and one can use AC¬¬
N,n to carry out Richman’s
argument, as follows.
Theorem 7.3. For each n ∈ N, the following theory is inconsistent.
CZF+ LLPOn +CT! +AC
¬¬
N,n
Proof. For each i, j ∈ N with j < n, we define αi,j ∈ N∞ as follows. αi,j(k) is
equal to 0 if the ith Turing machine with input i has halted by stage k with
output j, and αi,j(k) is equal to 1 otherwise.
Note that for any i and for any j, j′ < n with j 6= j′ we have αi,j ∨αi,j′ = 1
(since the ith Turing machine on input i can have at most 1 output). Hence we
can apply LLPOn to show that for some j < n, αi,j = 1.
Now we can apply AC¬¬N,n to find a function f : N→ n such that for each i,
¬¬αi,f(i) = 1. (In fact this implies that αi,f(i) = 1, but we don’t need this.)
Now apply CT! to find e ∈ N such that for all i, {e}(i) = f(i). In partic-
ular, the eth Turing machine with input e halts with output f(e). Hence, for
sufficiently large k we have αe,f(e)(k) = 0 and so αe,f(e) 6= 1. However, f(e) was
chosen so that ¬¬αe,f(e) = 1. Therefore we get a contradiction, as required.
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Hendtlass and Lubarsky showed in [9] that LLPOn+1 is independent of
LLPOn over IZF + DC using topological models. We obtain here a similar
separation result.
Corollary 7.4. For each n LLPOn+1 does not imply LLPOn over IZF +
MP+CT! +AC
¬¬
N,n +HACN,N.
Proof. IZF +MP + CT! + AC
¬¬
N,n + HACN,N + LLPOn+1 is consistent by
theorem 7.2 and proposition 6.19 but IZF+MP+CT! +AC
¬¬
N,n + LLPOn is
not by theorem 7.3.
In addition we get the following corollary by the same argument.
Corollary 7.5. AC¬¬
N,n does not imply AC
¬¬
N,n+1 over IZF + MP + CT! +
LLPOn+1 +HACN,N.
Proof. IZF +MP + CT! + LLPOn+1 + HACN,N + AC
¬¬
N,n is consistent by
theorem 7.2 and proposition 6.19 but IZF+MP+CT!+LLPOn+1+AC
¬¬
N,n+1
is not by theorem 7.3.
7.2 Existence Properties
Theorem 7.6. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let φ(x) be a formula with one
free variable, x. Suppose that
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ (∃j ∈ N)φ(j)
Then there is a finite set J ⊆ N such that
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢
∨
j∈J
φ(j)
Proof. Suppose that
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ (∃j ∈ N)φ(j)
Then we have by lemma 6.16 that
T +MP+ IPFn,NN ⊢ V
(Ln) |= (∃j ∈ N)φ(j)
Fix a primitive recursive encoding of finite sets of naturals as naturals. Then
by lemma 6.9, working in T +MP+ IPFn,NN we can prove that there exists a
natural number encoding a finite set J such that V (Ln) |= (∃j ∈ Jˆ)φ(j). Now
applying theorem 5.8 and absoluteness for primitive recursive formulas we have
a finite set J ⊆ N such that
T +MP+ IPFn,NN ⊢ V
(Ln) |=
∨
j∈J
φ(jˆ)
By lemma 5.5 we have in particular that,
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ V
(Ln) |=
∨
j∈J
φ(jˆ)
Finally we apply lemma 6.7 to get
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢
∨
j∈J
φ(j)
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Theorem 7.7. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let n, k ∈ N and k < n, and let
φ(x) be a formula with one free variable, x. Suppose that
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ (∃
≤kx)φ(x)
Then for some j ∈ N we have
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ ¬¬φ(j) (7)
T +MP+ LLPO⌈n
k
⌉ ⊢ φ(j) (8)
Proof. Suppose that T+MP+LLPOn ⊢ (∃≤kx)φ(x). Then we have by lemma
6.16 that
T +MP+ IPFn,NN ⊢ V
(Ln) |= (∃≤kx)φ(x)
Hence, applying lemma 6.10 with pj := Jφ(jˆ)K, and writing Good(T ) to mean
T is a good ⌈n
k
⌉ tree and VeryGood(T ) to mean T is a very good tree,
T +MP+ IPFn,NN ⊢ (∃j ∈ N)(∃T ) Good(T ) ∧
VeryGood(T )→
(
V (Ln) |= φ(jˆ)
)
(9)
We now apply lemma 5.8 to find j ∈ N such that
T +MP+ IPFn,NN ⊢ (∃T ) Good(T ) ∧
VeryGood(T )→
(
V (Ln) |= φ(jˆ)
)
(10)
By lemma 5.5 we have in particular that,
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ (∃T ) Good(T ) ∧
VeryGood(T )→
(
V (Ln) |= φ(jˆ)
)
(11)
However, we also have by lemma 6.7 that
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ (∀j ∈ N)
(
V (Ln) |= φ(j)
)
→ φ(j)
Finally, we deduce (7) by corollary 4.21 and deduce (8) by theorem 4.14.
Corollary 7.8. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let n, k ∈ N and k < n, and let
φ1, . . . , φk be sentences. Suppose that
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢
k∨
i=1
φi
Then for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k we have
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ ¬¬φi
T +MP+ LLPO⌈n
k
⌉ ⊢ φi
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Corollary 7.9. Let T be one of CZF or IZF. Let n ∈ N and let φ(x) be a
formula with one free variable, x. Suppose that
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ (∃!x ∈ N)φ(x)
Then for some j ∈ N we have
T +MP+ LLPOn ⊢ φ(j)
Proof. This is a special case of (8) in theorem 7.7 taking k := 1.
By contrast, we see below that none of these theories can have the full
numerical existence property.
Theorem 7.10. The numerical existence property does not hold for any con-
sistent, recursively axiomatisable extension of CZF+ LLPO∞.
Proof. Let T be a consistent recursively axiomatisable extension of CZF +
LLPO∞. In fact, a similar proof works for any theory T that interprets enough
first order arithmetic to state LLPO∞ and carry out the constructions used in
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. However, for convenience we will use defini-
tions and notation from set theory.
Assume that we are given a bijective pairing on N with primitive recursive
pairing and projection functions, which we write as (, ), ()0 and ()1 respectively,
and let Pr be a primitive recursive provability predicate.
Construct by diagonalisation a formula φ(n), where n is the only free variable
and such that
T ⊢ (∀n ∈ N) (φ(n) ↔ ((∀m ∈ N) ((m)0 = n ∧ Pr((m)1, pφ(n)q) →
(∃m′ < m) Pr((m′)1, pφ((m
′)0)q)))) (12)
Write ψ(n,m) for the formula
ψ(n,m) := ((m)0 = n ∧ Pr((m)1, pφ(n)q) →
(∃m′ < m) Pr((m′)1, pφ((m
′)0)q))) (13)
Now define for each n ∈ N, αn ∈ N∞ as follows
αn(l) :=
{
1 for all m ≤ l, ψ(n,m)
0 otherwise
So that we can apply LLPO∞, we first show that for all n 6= n′ we have
αn ∨ αn′ = 1. For any l ∈ N, assume for a contradiction that αn ∨ αn′(l) = 0.
Without loss of generality we may assume l is the least such number (since
ψ(n,m) is primitive recursive and so decidable). By the minimality of l we
must have either ¬ψ(n, l) or ¬ψ(n′, l). However, we cannot have both of these
since this would imply (l)0 = n and (l)0 = n
′. Hence we have without loss of
generality (l)0 = n and since αn′(l) = 0 and ψ(n
′, l), there must be some l′ < l
such that ¬ψ(n′, l′). In particular we have Pr((l′)1, pφ((l′)0)q) but also for all
m < l, ¬Pr((m)1, pφ((m)0)q), giving us a contradiction. Therefore, αn∨αn′ = 1
as required.
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We can now apply LLPO∞ to show that T ⊢ (∃n ∈ N)αn = 1. Note that
this implies T ⊢ (∃n ∈ N)φ(n).
Now if we assume that the numerical existence property holds for T then
there must be some n ∈ N such that T ⊢ φ(n). So there must be m such that
(m)1 codes a proof for φ((m)0) (by taking (m)0 = n). Since the provability
predicate is decidable, without loss of generality we can take m to be the least
number such that (m)1 codes a proof for φ((m)0). By the minimality of m we
have that for all m′ < m, ¬Pr((m′)1, φ((m′)0)). But this is a ∆0 sentence, so
by absoluteness for ∆0 sentences we have
T ⊢ ¬(∃m′ < m) Pr((m′)1, φ((m
′)0))
Again by absoluteness of ∆0 sentences, we also have
T ⊢ (m)0 = (m)0 ∧ Pr((m)1, pφ((m)0)q)
Hence we have T ⊢ ¬φ((m)0), contradicting that T ⊢ φ((m)0) and the consis-
tency of T . Therefore the numerical existence property must fail for T .
Corollary 7.11. For every n, there is a formula with one free variable, φ(x),
such that IZF + LLPOn +MP ⊢ (∃x ∈ N)φ(x) but for every formula ψ(x),
IZF+ LLPOn +MP 0 (∃!x ∈ N)φ(x) ∧ ψ(x).
Proof. Let φ(x) be the formula from the proof of theorem 7.10. If IZF +
LLPOn +MP ⊢ (∃!x ∈ N)φ(x) ∧ ψ(x) was provable, then by corollary 7.9
there would be some j such that IZF + LLPOn +MP ⊢ φ(j) ∧ ψ(j). But
in particular this gives IZF + LLPOn + MP ⊢ φ(j) contradicting theorem
7.10.
In [7], Friedman showed that for every recursively axiomatisable extension
of Heyting arithmetic the disjunction property implies the numerical existence
property. He further remarks, without proof, that there is a ∆02 extension that
satisfies the disjunction property but not the numerical existence property. As
a corollary of the above results, we obtain a reasonably natural example of a Π02
theory with the disjunction property but not the numerical existence property.
Corollary 7.12. Assume classical logic in the meta theory. The theory T :=⋂
n IZF +MP + LLPOn (i.e. the set of formulas provable in IZF +MP +
LLPOn for every n) has the disjunction property.
Proof. Suppose that T ⊢ φ∨ψ. Then, for each n, IZF+MP+LLPO2n ⊢ φ∨ψ.
Hence either IZF+MP+LLPOn ⊢ φ or IZF+MP+LLPOn ⊢ ψ. Let X :=
{n ∈ N | IZF+MP+LLPOn ⊢ φ} and Y := {n ∈ N | IZF+MP+LLPOn ⊢
φ}. X and Y are downwards closed subsets of N such that X ∪ Y = N. By
classical logic we therefore have either X = N or Y = N. Without loss of
generality, say X = N. Then we have that for every n,
IZF+MP+ LLPOn ⊢ φ
But we have now shown the disjunction property for this theory.
Theorem 7.13. The theory T :=
⋂
n IZF +MP + LLPOn (i.e. the set of
formulas provable in IZF + MP + LLPOn for every n) does not have the
numerical existence property.
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Proof. Note that the statement (∃n ∈ N)LLPOn can be formalised in set theory
and holds in each IZF +MP + LLPOn for each n. However, for each n, we
have seen that IZF +MP + LLPOn+1 does not prove LLPOn, so it is not
provable in T . Hence T proves (∃n ∈ N)LLPOn but does not prove LLPOn
for any n, so the numerical existence property fails.
7.3 Consistency of Brouwerian Continuity Principles
Recall that the fan theorem and bar induction are defined as below.
Definition 7.14. Write 2∗ for the set of finite binary sequences. If α : N→ 2 is
an infinite binary sequence, write α¯(n) for the finite binary sequence of length
n obtained by restricting α.
A subset R of 2∗ is a bar if for every α : N → 2, there exists some n ∈ N
such that ¯α(n) ∈ R.
A bar, R, is uniform if there exists n ∈ N such that for all α : N→ 2, there
exists m ≤ n such that α¯(m) ∈ R.
The fan theorem, Fan is the axiom that every bar is uniform.
A subset R of N∗ is a bar if for every α : N → N, there exists some n ∈ N
such that ¯α(n) ∈ R.
A bar, R, is monotone if whenever s ∈ R and s′ is a finite binary sequence
extending s, then also s′ ∈ R.
If s and t are finite binary sequences, write s ∗ t for the concatenation of s
and t.
Monotone bar induction, BIM , is the following axiom. Let Q ⊂ N∗ be such
that there is a monotone bar R with R ⊆ Q and Q has the property that
whenever s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ Q for all n also s ∈ Q. Then 〈〉 ∈ Q.
Proposition 7.15 (CZF +MP). Let V P be the function realizability model
from [15]. Then MP holds in V P.
Proof. This can easily be checked by applyingMP in the background and noting
that there is a continuous functional that takes as input α : N → 2 such that
there exists n with α(n) = 1 and returns the first n such that α(n) = 1.
Lemma 7.16 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN + Fan).
V (Ln) |= Fan
Proof. Let R ∈ V (Ln) be such that the statement that R is a bar holds in V (Ln).
We first construct a set R′ in the background universe and check that R′ is a
bar. Let R′ be the set of σ ∈ 2∗ such that V (Ln) |= (∃σ′ ∈ R)σ′ ≤ σˆ.
To show that R′ is a bar, let α ∈ 2N. Then V (Ln) |= (∃j ∈ N) ¯ˆα(j) ∈ R,
since R is internally a bar in V (Ln). Hence by lemma 6.9, there is a finite set
J ⊆ N such that V (Ln) |= (∃j ∈ J) ¯ˆα(j) ∈ R. Then set N := max J . We clearly
have α¯(N) ∈ R′, and so R′ is a bar.
We can now apply Fan in the background universe to find m such that
for every α ∈ 2N there exists l ≤ m such that α¯(l) ∈ R′. But we now have
V (Ln) |= (∃x ≤ mˆ) α¯(x) ∈ R as required.
Lemma 7.17 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN +BIM ).
V (Ln) |= BIM
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Proof. Suppose that R,Q ∈ V (Ln) are such that in V (Ln) the following holds:
R ⊆ Q ⊆ N∗, R is a monotone bar and whenever Q contains every immediate
successor of σ ∈ N∗, it also contains σ. We first define external versions of R
and Q as follows:
R′ := {σ ∈ N∗ | V (Ln) |= σˆ ∈ R}
Q′ := {σ ∈ N∗ | V (Ln) |= σˆ ∈ Q}
Note that we can easily show R′ ⊆ Q′ ⊆ N∗ and that R′ is monotone. To
apply BIM in the background, it only remains to check that R
′ is a bar and that
for any σ ∈ N∗ if Q′ contains every immediate successor of σ it also contains σ.
To check that R′ is a bar, let f : N→ N. Then V (Ln) |= (∃x ∈ N)
¯ˆ
f(x) ∈ R.
Hence by lemma 6.9, there is a finite set J ⊆ N such that V (Ln) |=
∨
j∈J
¯ˆ
f(j) ∈
R. Then set N := maxJ . By monotonicity we have that for each j ∈ J ,
V (Ln) |=
¯ˆ
f(j) ∈ R →
¯ˆ
f(N) ∈ R. So we deduce that V (Ln) |=
¯ˆ
f(N) ∈ R and so
f¯(N) ∈ R′. Therefore R′ is a bar as required.
Now let σ ∈ N∗ be such that for all m ∈ N, σ ∗ 〈m〉 ∈ Q′. Then by
absoluteness, we have V (Ln) |= (∀x ∈ N) σˆ ∗ 〈x〉 ∈ Q. Therefore, V (Ln) |= σˆ ∈ Q
and so σ ∈ Q′.
We can now apply BIM in the background to deduce that 〈〉 ∈ Q′. Therefore
V (Ln) |= 〈〉 ∈ Q. So we have confirmed BIM holds in V (Ln) as required.
Lemma 7.18 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN +Cont(N
N,N)).
V (Ln) |= Cont(NN,N)
Proof. Suppose V (Ln) |= F : NN → N. Then by lemma 6.14 there is G : NN → N
such that V (Ln) |= F = Gˆ. Let α ∈ NN. By Cont(NN,N) in the background,
there exists j such that for any β ∈ NN, α¯(j) = β¯(j) implies G(α) = G(β).
However, by absoluteness we then have V (Ln) |= (∀β ∈ NN) α¯(j) = β¯(j) →
G(α) = G(β). But we now have that in V (Ln), Gˆ and so also F are continuous.
We deduce Cont(NN,N) in V (Ln).
Lemma 7.19 (CZF +MP + IPFn,NN +AC2). Let n, k ∈ N and 2 ≤ k < n.
Then
V (Ln) |= AC
⌈n
k
⌉
NN,k
Proof. By adapting the proof of lemma 6.20 and applying AC2 in the back-
ground.
Lemma 7.20 (CZF+MP+ IPFn,NN +AC2).
V (Ln) |= HACNN,N
Proof. By adapting the proof of lemma 6.23 and applying AC2 in the back-
ground.
Theorem 7.21. Assume CZF is consistent. Then for each n, so is the follow-
ing theory.
CZF+CC+ Fan+AC2 +RDC+MP+ IPFn,NN (14)
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AssumeCZF+MP+REA is consistent. Then for each n, so is the following
theory.
CZF+REA+CC+BIM +AC2 +RDC+MP+ IPFn,NN (15)
Proof. Using proposition 7.15 and lemma 5.10 one can easily adapt the proof
of [15, Theorem 9.10] to show this.
Theorem 7.22. If CZF is consistent then for each n, the following theory is
also consistent.
CZF+MP+
∧
2≤k<n
AC
⌈n
k
⌉
NN,k
+HACNN,N+LLPOn+Cont(N
N,N)+Fan (16)
If CZF + REA is consistent then for each n, the following theory is also
consistent.
CZF+MP+
∧
2≤k<n
AC
⌈n
k
⌉
NN,k
+HACNN,N+LLPOn+Cont(N
N,N)+BIM (17)
Proof. We build V (Ln) in the theory (14), which is consistent by theorem 7.21.
We then have that V (Ln) models (16) by lemmas 6.15, 7.19, 7.20, 6.16, 7.18 and
7.16. To add monotone bar induction we also apply lemma 7.17.
(There is already a similar result for LLPO over second order arithmetic
due to Van Oosten in [21, Section 5].)
Corollary 7.23. CZF+MP+
∧
2≤k<nAC
⌈n
k
⌉
NN,k
+HACNN,N+LLPOn+Cont(N
N,N)+
BIM does not prove LCP or ACNN,2.
Proof. CZF+MP+
∧
2≤k<nAC
⌈n
k
⌉
NN,k
+HACNN,N +LLPOn +Cont(N
N,N) +
BIM is consistent, so it suffices to show CZF + LLPOn + LCP and CZF +
LLPOn +Cont(N
N,N) +ACNN,2 are not.
In both cases, we show the theories are inconsistent by first noting that there
is a surjection F : NN ։ {〈α1, . . . , αn〉 ∈ Nn∞ | αi ∨ αj = 1, for i 6= j}, defined
as follows.
(F (α))i(k) =
{
0 α(k′) ≡ i mod n+ 1 where k′ ≤ k least s.t. α(k′) 6= 0
1 otherwise
By LLPOn, there is 1 ≤ i ≤ n for each α ∈ NN such that (F (α))i = 1.
Let α be such that (F (α))i = 1 for all i. By LCP there is some i, k ∈ N such
that whenever β¯(k) = α¯(k), (F (β))i = 1. However, we can now easily find β
such that β¯(k) = α¯(k) but (F (β))i 6= 1 to get a contradiction. Similarly, we can
use ACNN,2 to get a function G : N
N → N such that for all α, (F (α))G(α) = 1,
contradicting Cont(NN,N).
8 Connections to Other Formal Systems
8.1 Connections to Topos Theory
The Ln considered in this paper appear to be strongly related to the local
operators in the effective topos previously considered by Lee and Van Oosten
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in [10], specifically to the local operators corresponding to finitary sights. We
expect that in fact these local operators can be obtained by carrying out the
construction of Ln in the effective topos. The realizability model V
P corresponds
to the topos RT(K2) (as described, for example, in [23, Section 4.3]). Since we
only require computable functions, one might expect our constructions to work
also in the relative realizability topos RT(KREC2 ,K2) (see [23, Section 4.5]). The
realizability with truth model is related to the topos (Eff ↓ ∆) obtained by
gluing along the inclusion functor from Set to Eff. Putting this all together, we
make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 8.1. Some of the local operators in Eff considered in [10] have
counterparts in the toposes RT(K2), RT(KREC2 ,K2) and (Eff ↓ ∆).
(We again point out that Van Oosten has already shown that the original
Lifschitz realizability model has a counterpart in RT(K2) (see [23, Section 4.3])
and for q-realizability (an ancestor of realizability with truth) (see [21, Propo-
sition 3.5])).
8.2 Connections to Type Theory
Definition 8.2. Let Γ be a context in type theory. We say that Γ has propo-
sitional canonicity for N if whenever Γ ⊢ t : N, there is some n ∈ N and a term
p such that Γ ⊢ p : IdN(t, n).
Suppose we are working in a variant of type theory that has a propositional
truncation operator (such as type theory with brackets, as in [4]). In such
theories there are two different ways of formalising LLPO depending on whether
or not we use the propositional truncation operator ‖−‖. We call these LLPO+
and LLPO∨ and define them as follows.
LLPO+ :=
∏
α:N→2
 ∏
m,n:N
(α(m) = 1 + α(n) = 1 → m = n)
 →
((∏
n:N
α(2n) = 0
)
+
(∏
n:N
α(2n+ 1) = 0
))
LLPO∨ :=
∏
α:N→2
 ∏
m,n:N
(α(m) = 1 + α(n) = 1 → m = n)
 →
∥∥∥∥∥
(∏
n:N
α(2n) = 0
)
+
(∏
n:N
α(2n+ 1) = 0
)∥∥∥∥∥
By adapting the proof of theorem 7.10, we have,
Theorem 8.3. The context (x : LLPO+) does not have propositional canon-
icity for N over any variant of type theory for which it is consistent (that is,
there is no term of type ⊥ in context (x : LLPO+)) and such that the set of
judgements is computably enumerable.
However, we expect by analogy with the results in this paper that the fol-
lowing holds.
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Conjecture 8.4. The context (x : LLPO∨) has propositional canonicity for N
over type theory with bracket types, as studied by Awodey and Bauer in [4], or
similar systems studied by Maietti in [12].
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